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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“Resource shuffling” occurs when different subnational approaches to 
carbon regulation create variations in the costs of production across 
jurisdictions.  California is the most aggressive jurisdiction in the United 
States to address climate change and has adopted a cap & trade program 
for its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.  This Article addresses the 
resource shuffling issue presented by California’s cap-and-trade program 
and evaluates the merits of various legal and regulatory solutions to the 
problem. 
Opportunities for resource shuffling arise because of the competitive 
interstate electric power market, which is managed largely by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  Left to market forces, utilities 
seeking to purchase electricity generally favor the least-cost source of 
electric power.  Federally managed interstate markets tend to reinforce 
these least-cost power dispatch practices (i.e., transmission operators deploy 
resources to meet demand based on the least marginal cost), but this poses a 
potential challenge for subnational regulation of carbon emissions, such 
as California’s cap-and-trade program. 
A primary goal of California’s program is to force power generation 
facilities within its borders to reduce carbon dioxide emissions while 
allowing individual producers and sellers of energy to make their own 
choices regarding resource allocation.  However, California’s cap-and-trade 
scheme seeks to do more than reduce greenhouse gas emissions that occur 
from plants within state borders; it also seeks to reduce all emissions that 
occur as a result of electricity consumed within California’s borders, 
regardless of where the power supply source is located.1 
The potential for resource shuffling—replacing cleaner sources of 
electric power with dirtier and cheaper sources of energy—threatens 
to undermine California’s environmental goals.  About 30 percent of the 
electricity consumed in California is imported from other states.2  This 
imported electricity tends to come from disproportionately dirty sources 
(such as coal) and represents more than half of the carbon dioxide emitted as 
a result of the state’s electricity demand.3  Because of the significance of 
these out-of-state GHG emissions, California’s cap-and-trade regime 
would only address a small portion of the actual GHG impacts associated 
 
 1.  See CAL. CODE REGS. Tit. 17, § 95802(a)(140), 95811(b). 
 2.  California Electricity Statistics & Data, ENERGY ALMANAC, http://energyalmanac. 
ca.gov/electricity/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
 3.  James Bushnell, The Implementation of California AB 32 and its Impact on 
Wholesale Electricity Markets, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF ENERGY MARKETS at 5, August 
2007, available at http://www.iern.net/portal/page/portal/IERN_HOME/IERN_ARCHIV/ 
Publications/Competition_Issues/57AA9CE3EC9140C1E040A8C03C2F75CB. 
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with energy consumption within the state—absent some mechanism to 
reduce or eliminate incentives power sellers have to import energy from 
dirtier sources of electric power. 
As a matter of economic policy a state like California has an additional 
incentive to eliminate resource shuffling.  Resource shuffling exacerbates the 
problem of industrial-relocation carbon leakage because it leads to a 
situation in which covered entities are subject to emission limits and 
corresponding carbon price premiums, but out-of-state producers that export 
their power into the state are allowed to evade these limits and premiums.  
Thus, without some means of controlling resource shuffling, out-of-state 
producers and importers of power stand to benefit at the expense of in-
state electric power generators.  Overly aggressive efforts by California 
regulators to address this problem can also raise issues of protectionism 
that run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.4  The extent to which 
California has authority to regulate or even consider GHG emissions that 
occur outside of its borders under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution is subject to some dispute5—although recent case law would 
seem to favor California’s efforts to regulate emissions from out-of-state 
sources.6 
California regulators operate under a statutory obligation to minimize 
the leakage associated with the state’s GHG emissions programs, so 
reducing or eliminating shuffling appears to be required under state law.7  
California regulators have sought to prohibit resource shuffling, but the 
state’s approach to addressing resource shuffling has presented a potential 
tension with federal regulation of wholesale electric power markets, leading 
the state to suspend enforcement of its shuffling prohibitions and to 
 
 4.  As its name implies, the so-called “Dormant” Commerce clause does not expressly 
appear in the Constitution, but is derived from the Commerce Clause.  See U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 5.  For a defense of the constitutionality of California’s anti-resource-shuffling 
regulations under the Dormant Commerce Clause, see ERIN PARLAR, MICHAEL BABAKITIS & 
SHELLEY WELTON, LEGAL ISSUES IN REGULATING IMPORTS IN STATE AND REGIONAL CAP 
AND TRADE PROGRAMS 17–46 (2012), available at http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/ 
files/microsites/climate-change/files/Publications/Students/Legal%20Issues%20in%20Reg 
ulating%20Imports%20OCT2012.pdf [hereinafter Parlar]. 
 6.  See Rocky Mountain Farmer’s Union v. Corey (9th Cir. 2013), No. 12-15131 
(upholding California’s fuel standards under the Commerce Clause, even though they have 
an extraterritorial impact on out-of-state producers importing fuel into California). 
 7.  CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562(b)(8) (West 2013). 
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reassess its regulatory approach to the problem.8 Despite these changes, 
California’s modified approach to regulating resource shuffling remains 
problematic for the operation of wholesale power markets. This Article 
argues that short of a federal cap-and-trade program or a carbon tax that 
has a preemptive legal effect on state GHG regulation, federal regulators 
must play some role to minimize the tension between wholesale power 
markets and resource shuffling by paying attention to upstream interstate 
markets in electric power.  Such an approach can encourage subnational 
innovation in GHG regulation without thwarting the efficiency or reliability 
of wholesale power markets. 
Part II of this Article describes resource shuffling and its significance 
for subnational efforts to regulate GHG emissions, such as California’s 
cap-and-trade program for carbon emissions.  It also discusses California’s 
initial regulatory response to resource shuffling, known as “attestation.”  
Part III discusses the tension that California’s initial regulatory strategy 
presented with federal regulators who oversee wholesale electric power 
markets.  California’s amended “safe harbor” approach to regulating 
shuffling fails to avoid this tension and may even increase uncertainty for 
wholesale power markets. 
Part IV evaluates ways to more effectively regulate resource shuffling.  
One way California can address shuffling is to adjust the cap or emissions 
limits to reflect that shuffling would occur.  Ultimately, however, this 
Article argues that since shuffling is a form of carbon leakage a federal 
approach to addressing shuffling will be superior to subnational efforts.  
The conventional federal solution to leakage is to look to emissions 
regulation by the EPA to harmonize regulatory differences across states.  
This Article argues that while this conventional approach can potentially 
address a significant portion of the problem associated with resource 
shuffling, it is imperfect given the EPA’s anticipated flexible approach to 
carbon regulation.  Federal energy regulators could improve the efficacy of 
subnational efforts to address GHG emissions and produce greater 
certainty for power markets by addressing resource shuffling through a 
 
 8.  See Letter from Philip D. Moeller, Commissioner, FERC, to the Honorable 
Edmund G. Brown, Governor of California (Aug. 6, 2012), available at http://www.ferc. 
gov/about/com-mem/moeller/moeller-08-06-12.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Moeller]; Letter 
from Mary D. Nichols, Chairman, California Air Resource Board, to Philip D. Moeller, 
Commissioner, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Aug. 16, 2012), available at http:// 
www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/images/2012/response.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Nichols]; CAL. 
AIR RES. BD, RESOLUTION 12–33, CALIFORNIA CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2012), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/res12–33.pdf [hereinafter Resolution 12–33]; CAL. AIR 
RES. BD, RESOLUTION 12–51, CAL. CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM (2012), available at  
http://www.arb.ca/gov/cc/capandtrade/final-resolution-october-2012.pdf [hereinafter Resolution 
12–51]. 
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harmonized set of rules or guidelines articulating acceptable least-cost 
dispatch protocols for the operation of wholesale power markets.  Until 
that occurs, resource shuffling will continue to occur, thwarting the ability of 
subnational regulation to achieve GHG-reduction goals, and uncertainty 
about shuffling will continue to plague interstate power markets. 
II.  RESOURCE SHUFFLING AND CALIFORNIA’S INITIAL                  
REGULATORY RESPONSE 
To address the problem of global climate change, California has 
adopted a number of policies, including a Renewable Portfolio Standard 
(RPS),9 a Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS),10 and a GHG cap-and-trade 
program.11  Each of these policies is susceptible to carbon leakage, but 
California’s cap-and-trade program and its application to the electric 
power industry is the focus of this Article.  Recognizing both the importance 
of electricity generation as a source of GHG emissions and the sizeable 
share of power imports, California has crafted its cap-and-trade program 
to reduce not only the GHG emissions created within state borders but 
also all emissions generated as a result of electricity consumed within the 
state.12 
In large part, this expansion in the scope of the state’s GHG policy 
stems from a desire to minimize the impacts of carbon leakage.  The 
potential for carbon leakage occurs where one jurisdiction creates carbon- 
dioxide-emissions regulations that are more stringent than neighboring 
jurisdictions.  These more restrictive regulations increase the price of 
industrial activity—and thus the price of goods and services—in the first 
jurisdiction, creating a competitive advantage for the less restrictive 
jurisdictions.  This competitive advantage can lead neighboring jurisdictions 
to increase their output and accompanying GHG emissions, thus negating 
any potential benefits of the original jurisdiction’s GHG-emission 
restrictions. 
Even if power plants do not relocate to other jurisdictions, California’s 
broad approach to addressing GHG emissions makes power markets 
vulnerable to a form of gaming called “resource shuffling.”  In other words, 
buyers and sellers of electricity in the interstate market can take advantage 
 
 9.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16, et seq. (2013). 
 10.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480–90 (2013). 
 11.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95801, et seq. (2013). 
 12.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95802(a)(140), 95811(b) (2013). 
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of differences in costs across jurisdictions to by structuring their 
transactions to claim credit under the cap-and-trade program for GHG-
emissions reductions that only take place on paper. 
At the outset, an illustration of shuffling might help demonstrate its 
significance as a problem, as well as California’s response to it.  Suppose that 
two power plants with equal production capacity are both located outside 
of California’s borders.  Plant A burns high-carbon coal, while Plant B uses 
relatively low-carbon natural gas. For years, Plant A has operated under a 
contract to sell power to a California utility (for delivery to customers 
within California’s borders), while Plant B has a contract to sell power to 
a Nevada utility.  Since the California utility must buy permits for its GHG 
emissions, Plant A becomes more expensive.  Shuffling occurs when the 
Californian utility swaps contracts with the NV utility, thus lowering its 
compliance costs. Both plants continue operating and producing the same 
amount of electric power.  In this example there is no overall emissions 
reduction, but if Plant A is located further from the Nevada utility than 
Plant B, the Nevada utility may need to purchase a greater amount of 
electric power from Plant A to cover the line losses associated with 
transmission, and there could actually be an increase in the overall GHG 
emissions associated with delivering the same amount of electricity to 
customers. 
California directly responded to the problem of shuffling by prohibiting 
it in its initial regulations implementing its GHG cap-and-trade program.  
California Health & Safety Code § 38562(b)(8) requires that the California 
Air Resources Board (ARB) design its cap-and-trade rules in such a way 
that they minimize leakage.  ARB has chosen to minimize leakage through  
a “first-deliverer” approach.13 Under the first-deliverer approach, California’s 
cap-and-trade regulations apply to all first deliverers of electricity into the 
California grid, which includes both electricity-generating facilities in 
California and “electricity importers.”14 ARB has defined electricty importers 
as follows: 
“Electricity importers” deliver imported electricity. For electricity that is scheduled 
with a [North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC)] e-Tag to a final 
point of delivery inside the state of California, the electricity importer is identified 
on the NERC e-Tag as the purchasing- selling entity (PSE) on the last segment of 
the tag’s physical path with the point of receipt located outside the state of 
California and the point of delivery located inside the state of California. For facilities 
physically located outside the state of California with the first point of 
interconnection to a California balancing authority’s transmission and distribution 
system when the electricity is not scheduled on a NERC e-Tag, the importer is the 
 
 13. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95811 (2013). For a discussion of alternative 
approaches, see PARLAR, supra note 5, at 9–17. 
 14. Id. 
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facility operator or scheduling coordinator. Federal and state agencies are subject 
to the regulatory authority of ARB under this article and include Western Area Power 
Administration (WAPA), Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), and California 
Department of Water Resources (DWR).15 
By subjecting electricity importers to the reporting and compliance 
obligations, ARB’s cap-and-trade rules aim to reduce not only domestic 
emissions but also out-of-state emissions that occur as a consequence of 
meeting California’s electricity demand.16 
CARB’s first-deliverer approach to reducing out-of-state emissions that 
result from Californian electricity demand is vulnerable to a particular form 
of gaming called “resource shuffling.”  ARB has identified three specific 
forms of resource shuffling: 1) laundering, 2) cherry picking, and  3) facility 
swapping.17 
Laundering is made possible by ARB’s provision for  “unspecified 
power.”  When electricity is purchased from the grid, the original generation 
source is not always specified.18  As a practical measure, ARB’s cap-and-
trade regulations assign unspecified power a “default emissions rate,” which 
an electricity importer uses to calculate its reporting and compliance 
obligations.19  The level at which this default emissions rate is set is 
important: if the rate is set higher than the actual emissions rate, then 
electricity importers will have an incentive to specify the source of their 
power in order to report fewer emissions and use up fewer allowances; if 
the default rate is set lower than actual emissions, the electricity importers 
will have an incentive to avoid specified power because using the default 
 
 15.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(140) (2013).  For a helpful visual 
description of the electricity importer concept, see SCOTT MURTISHAW, FIRST DELIVERER 
APPROACH TO REGULATING ELECTRICITY IMPORTS IN CAP AND TRADE PROGRAMS 7, 14 
(2011), available at http://www.rggi.org/docs/ProgramReview/LearningSession1/Presentation 
_Scott_Murtishaw_CA_PUC.pdf. 
 16.  In addition, the fact that ARB relies on NERC e-Tags to identify electricity 
importers is significant because it potentially exacerbates the potential for California to 
engage in extraterritorial regulation of the electricity industry, as evidenced by a recent 
California Independent System Operator (CAISO) tariff dispute heard by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).  See generally, Order Accepting Compliance 
Filing, Denying Late Interventions, and Dismissing Rehearing Requests, 142 FERC        ¶ 
61,111, Docket Nos. ER12-1856-001, ER12-1856-002, Issued Feb. 13, 2013.  However, a full 
treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
 17.  CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM ELECTRICITY WORKSHOP 24 
(2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/050412/may4electricityppt.pdf. 
 18.  See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(281) (2013). 
 19.  See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95111(b)(1), 95852(b)(1)(B) (2013). 
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emissions rate will lower their reporting and compliance obligations.20  
Laundering is the phenomenon that occurs in the latter situation.  Sources 
have described laundering as electricity importers labeling electricity 
whose source is or could be specified as unspecified in order to take 
advantage of the comparatively lower default emissions rate,21 though 
electricity importers could achieve this same result by terminating their 
contracts with high-emission, specified sources of power and replacing those 
contracts with unspecified power.  ARB has set the default emissions rate 
at .428 MT of CO2e/MWh, which is representative of a relatively clean-
burning natural gas plant.22  Because this emissions rate is relatively low, 
there is a significant possibility for extensive resource laundering.23  One 
study estimates that labeling all specified power as unspecified would 
result in an on-paper reduction of 10 mm tons of carbon dioxide that 
would not occur in the real world.24 
Cherry picking, like laundering, is related to the concept of unspecified 
power, but it works slightly differently.25  Whereas laundering occurs when 
the specified power has a higher emission rate than the default rate, cherry 
picking occurs when the specified power has a lower emissions rate than the 
default rate.26  Again, this practice has been described as an act of active 
deception wherein electricity importers characterize actually unspecified, 
system-produced electricity as originating at a low-emitting source.27  
However, a Californian electricity importer can achieve this same result 
by replacing its contracts for unspecified power with sources of power 
that emit less than the default emissions rate.28 
Facility swapping occurs when an electricity importer replaces a contract 
for power from a source with higher emissions for a contract for power 
 
 20.  See JAMES BUSHNELL, ET AL., DOWNSTREAM REGULATION OF CO2 EMISSIONS IN 
CALIFORNIA’S ELECTRICITY SECTOR 6 (2013), available at http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/ 
pdf/working_papers/WP236.pdf [hereinafter Bushnell, Downstream Regulation]. 
 21.  DAVID FARNSWORTH AND RACHAEL TERADA, TRACKING EMISSIONS ASSOCIATED 
WITH ENERGY SERVING LOAD IN THE REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE STATES: A 
FEASIBILITY STUDY, APP. 3, at 57 (2013) [hereinafter Farnsworth, et al.]. 
 22.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95111(b)(1) (2013); Bushnell, Downstream Regulation, 
supra note 20, at 6. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Farnsworth, et al., supra note 21, at 57. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  For a mathematical description of this more benign form of cherry picking, see 
Letter from Judi K. Mosley, Pacific Gas & Electric, to Steven Cliff, Chief, Climate Change 
Markets Branch, California Air Resources Board (May 11, 2012), available at http://www. 
arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/9-051112_pg_e_comments_on_compliance _requirements_ 
00125651-2_.pdf [hereinafter Letter from PG&E]. 
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from a source with lower emissions.29 Nominally, this seems like ideal 
compliance with the objective of the state’s cap-and-trade scheme: 
electricity importers replacing dirty sources of electricity with cleaner 
ones.  However, because both clean and dirty sources in this scenario are 
outside of California, there is no absolute prohibition or limitation on the 
operation of the dirtier generating facility. Instead, the dirty electricity 
may simply be redeployed to serve another location’s demand, resulting 
in no net reduction in emissions.  Furthermore, because of the nature of 
the electricity market (electrons travel in the path of least resistance, 
according to the laws of physics), “green” electrons cannot be separated 
from “brown” ones.  To whatever extent a California transaction leads to 
emissions reductions, they may only exist on paper.  The hypothetical 
illustration above involving Plant A and Plant B appears to be an example of 
facility swapping. 
Regardless of whether it is laundering, cherry picking or facility 
swapping, for California, the practical impact of shuffling poses a 
substantial threat to the ability of AB 32 to meet its goals.  California 
imports 30 percent of the electricity consumed within its borders.30  Coal 
plants represent the most significant source of power imports, and GHG 
emissions from imported power account for as much as 47 percent of 
California’s total emissions from the electricity sector.31  According to 
one analysis, resource shuffling “could result in leakage that exceeds the 
cumulative mitigation required under the cap-and-trade market through 
2020.”32 One study estimates the carbon dioxide leakage associated with 
resource shuffling at 108–187 million metric tons of carbon dioxide 
leakage, which translates to 47–197 percent of cumulative expected 
mitigation by 2020 under AB 32.33  Furthermore, California’s fears of 
 
 29.  See DANNY CULLENWARD AND DAVID WEISKOPF, RESOURCE SHUFFLING AND 
THE CALIFORNIA CARBON MARKET 10 (2013), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/ 
default/files/publication/440262/doc/slspublic/Resource%20Shuffling%20-%20Cullenward 
%20and%20Weiskopf.pdf [hereinafter Cullenward & Weiskopf]. 
 30.  California Energy Commission, California Electricity Statistics & Data, THE 
CALIFORNIA ENERGY ALMANAC, available at http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/electricity/ (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2014). 
 31.  Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 6. 
 32.  See Danny Cullenward, Don’t Let Accounting Tricks Dominate the Carbon 
Market, BERC ENERGY WEEK 2013, http://berc.berkeley.edu/digital-symposium/dont-let-
accounting-tricks-dominate-the-carbon-market/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) [hereinafter 
Cullenward, Accounting Tricks]. 
 33.  Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 2. 
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resource shuffling are not entirely abstract.  Californian independent 
electricity generators are particularly worried about the potential for 
laundering, especially in light of the Arizona Public Service Company’s 
(APS) communications to the market that purchases of electricity from 
any of its generation assets should be treated as unspecified purchases 
from the Arizona system.34  If the market follows the APS’s suggestion, 
then significant laundering could result because 61.7 percent of the APS’s 
generation mix comes from sources that likely emit more than the default 
emissions rate.35 
In the initial design of its cap-and-trade program, ARB addressed this 
potential gaming of the system by instituting an outright prohibition on 
resource shuffling.36  ARB originally defined resource shuffling as “any 
plan, scheme, or artifice to receive credit based on emissions reductions 
that have not occurred, involving the delivery of electricity to the California 
grid.”37  In addition to its prohibition on shuffling, ARB planned on 
enforcing its anti-resource-shuffling regulations by imposing an attestation 
requirement on first deliverers.  Under this attestation requirement, first 
deliverers would have to certify that they have not engaged in resource 
shuffling under penalty of perjury.38 
III.  FERC’S RESPONSE AND CALIFORNIA’S NEW REGULATORY                  
REGIME FOR RESOURCE SHUFFLING 
California’s initial approach to banning resource shuffling at its borders 
presented a conflict with federal regulation of wholesale electric power 
markets in the western U.S., given the impact a blanket prohibition on 
shuffling at California’s border could have on the operation of regional 
wholesale power markets.  At the extreme, California’s “attestation” anti- 
resource-shuffling regulations potentially conflict with least-cost dispatch 
practices, which generally would lead transmission operators to favor the 
lowest cost sources of electric power in the interstate market.  In addition, by 
 
 34.  Letter from Jan Smutny-Jones, Exec. Dir., Indep. Energy Producers Ass’n, to 
Mary Nichols, Chair, Cal. Air Res. Bd. (July 10, 2013), http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/reporting/ 
ghg-rep/revision-2013/iepattch.pdf [hereinafter Smutny-Jones]. 
 35.  ARIZ. PUB. SERV. CO., 2012 INTEGRATED RESOURCE PLAN 6 (2012, available at  
http://www.aps.com/library/resource%20alt/2012ResourcePlan.pdf. 38 percent of the 
APS’s mix comes from coal fire power plants, and 23.7 percent comes from natural gas. 
Id. The default emissions rate set by ARB is equivalent to a relatively clean-burning 
natural gas plant.  Bushnell, Downstream Regulation, supra note 20, at 6.  Thus, even if 
all of the ASP’s natural gas plants are clean burning, that still means that almost 40 percent 
of the ASP’s generation assets probably exceed the default emission rate. 
 36.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(2) (2013). 
 37.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95802(a)(252) (2013). 
 38.  CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95852(b)(2)(A) (2013). 
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influencing whose power may be purchased, California’s anti-resource 
shuffling regulations can potentially affect grid reliability.  Following 
federal regulators’ request that California suspend its shuffling attestation 
requirement and prohibition, California has developed a new approach to 
regulating shuffling.  Rather than prohibit all shuffling at its border without 
defining which practices are and are not shuffling, the new California 
resource shuffling regulations focus on identifying which practices are not 
shuffling, so that power producers and importers hopefully will have 
clarity regarding transactions to serve power demand in California. 
A.  FERC’s Response and the Impact on Wholesale Power Markets 
On May 4, 2012, ARB held a meeting with stakeholders to discuss its 
first deliverer approach and its resource-shuffling regulations.39  In 
response, twenty-two participants filed comments with CARB, the bulk 
of which protested the vagueness of the ARB definition for resource 
shuffling.40  Many of these participants commented that ARB’s definition of 
resource shuffling could cover transactions that are standard or even 
legally mandated in the electricity market.41  These commentators wanted 
ARB to develop a more detailed definition of resource shuffling that would 
specify when an electricity transaction would and would not qualify as 
resource shuffling.42  Some also wanted ARB to develop procedures for 
ex ante, case-by-case guidance similar to no-action letters.43  Some even 
submitted competing comments on the problems that could arise as a result 
of ARB depending on NERC’s e-Tags for its definition of electricity 
 
 39.  See CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE PROGRAM ELECTRICITY (2012), available 
at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/050412/may4electricityppt.pdf. 
 40.  These comments have been posted online. See Workshop Comments Log, CAL. 
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR RES. BD., http://www.arb.ca.gov/lispub/comm2/ 
bccommlog.php?listname=5-4-electricity-ws (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). 
 41.  See Letter from Claudia Orlando et al., San Diego Gas & Electric, to California Air 
Resources Board (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/8-
sdge_commts-resource_shuffling_carb.5.11.12.docx [hereinafter Letter from SDG&E]; 
see also Letter from PG&E, supra note 28. 
 42.  See, e.g., Letter from SDG&E, supra note 41, at 1–3. 
 43.  See, e.g., Comments of Sempra US Gas and Power on the California Air Resource 
Board 5/4/2012 Electricity Sector Workshop (May 4, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/ 
5-4-electricity-ws/5-carb_5-4-2012_electricity_sector_workshop_-_sempra_usgp_comments. 
docx. 
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importer.44  In any case, the consensus of the comments was that industry 
was concerned about the risk of excessive liability because of the 
combination of the perceived vagueness of resource shuffling and ARB’s 
perjury-enforced attestation requirement.45 
In addition to its vagueness, California’s anti-resource-shuffling 
regulations may clash with least-cost-dispatch rules and practices. In 
wholesale power markets, power engineers and transmission operators 
routinely follow least-cost-dispatch practices, which would draw on the 
lowest cost marginal generation resource to meet expected power demand.46  
However, under the anti-resource-shuffling regulations, factors other than 
low generation and bilateral procurement costs drive procurement 
decisions.  These conflicting requirements can create confusion and 
uncertainty for market actors. 
For example, Pacific Gas & Electric’s (PG&E) comments in response 
to the May 4 meeting provide a simple, concise illustration of the kind of 
decision an electricity importer may face.47  PG&E’s primary concern was 
that the cost of allowances would increase the cost of higher-emission 
electricity to a point at which the otherwise more expensive purchase of 
lower-emission electricity would be mandated by their least-cost-dispatch 
practices.48 However, by choosing the lower-emission electricity, and thus 
purchasing fewer allowances, PG&E might run afoul of the anti-resource- 
shuffling rules because it would be taking credit for emissions reductions 
that do not necessarily occur.49  The selling utility could simply redeploy 
the higher-emission electricity to serve local or other non-Californian 
 
 44.  Compare Letter from Mary Wiencke, PacifiCorp, to California Air Resources 
Board, at 1–7 (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/11-arb_may 
_4_workshop_comments_pacificorp_051112.pdf, and Comments of J. Aron & Company, at 
1–3 (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/17-j_aron_capandtrade_ 
comment_may4_2012_workshop.pdf (requesting that ARB not assert jurisdiction over 
out-of-state sellers selling power into the CAISO market), with Comments of Southern 
California Edison Company to the California Air Resources Board on the Public Meeting 
to Discuss Compliance Requirements for First Deliveries of Electricity, Held May 4, 2012, 
at 2, 8–9 (May 11, 2012), http://www.arb.ca.gov/lists/5-4-electricity-ws/13-2012- 
05-11_sce_comments_on_electricity_imports_workshop.pdf [hereinafter Comments of 
Southern California Edison] (advocating for ARB to “[w]ork  with the California 
Independent System Operator (“CAISO”) to amend the CAISO Tariff in order to assert 
jurisdiction over out-of-state sellers who participate in the CAISO market, at nodes that 
are physically located outside California”). 
 45.  See, e.g., Comments of Southern California Edison, supra note 44, at 1–4, 6–7. 
 46.  See CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DEC.  02-10-062, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING 
TO ESTABLISH POLICIES AND COST RECOVERY MECHANISMS FOR RULEMAKING GENERATION 
PROCUREMENT AND RENEWABLE RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, (2002), available at http://docs. 
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/20249.pdf. 
 47.  See Letter from PG&E, supra note 28, at 1–3. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
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demand, in which case no emissions reductions would actually occur.  
While the particular example discussed in PG&E’s comments represents 
a possible case of cherry picking,50 one could easily imagine this same 
scenario playing out in the laundering or facility-swapping contexts. 
This conflict strikes at the heart of California’s cap-and-trade scheme.  
On the one hand, the purpose of cap-and-trade schemes is to force firms 
to internalize the pollution-related costs of their behaviors in order to 
promote societal welfare.  Thus, cap-and-trade proponents should rejoice 
at a hypothetical electricity importer’s decision to purchase lower-emission 
electricity based on the fact that the lower-emission electricity is cheaper.  On 
the other hand, cap-and-trade proponents would undoubtedly be 
concerned that this transaction does not reduce total GHG emissions.  
Moreover, labeling such a transaction as resource shuffling could reduce 
the effectiveness of the cap-and-trade scheme by undermining the price 
competitiveness of low-emission electricity; if an electricity importer 
cannot claim credit for the purchase of low-emission electricity, then it 
will be unable to reduce its expenditure on allowances, even though it has 
purchased lower-emission electricity. 
Another concern is that a prohibition of shuffling at California’s border 
could exacerbate the industrial-relocation form of carbon leakage.  Any 
prohibition of shuffling at California’s border will almost certainly increase 
the price of power being imported into California relative to the price of 
power consumed elsewhere.  Inevitably, this increase in the price of power 
imports will benefit Californian in-state energy producers.  To the degree that 
the increase in the price of imported electricity protects in-state producers 
by subjecting both domestic and foreign producers to the cap-and-trade 
requirements, this consequence is not only intended but is the very goal 
of California’s first-deliverer approach to carbon leakage.  Because 
electricity producers will not be able to meet California’s demand at lower 
cost by moving production outside of the regulated jurisdiction, the  
first-deliverer approach—as supported by the resource-shuffling prohibition 
—will prevent industrial-relocation carbon leakage in the electricity-
generation sector.  However, by increasing the price of all electricity 
consumed in California, this regulatory scheme may push mobile electricity- 
 
 50.  This example would be cherry picking because PG&E would be choosing 
between  unspecified power, with its associated default emissions rate of .428 MT/MWh, 
and a specified zero-emission power source.  Letter from PG&E, supra note 28. See 
Farnsworth, supra note 25, at 57. 
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intensive consumers—for example, factories—out of California, where 
they can purchase more and dirtier electricity. 
Beyond potentially shifting electricity demand out of California, a 
resource shuffling prohibition at California’s border can affect the reliability 
of the grid elsewhere in the Western United States.  To the extent that 
California prohibits its utilities from shuffling dirty power supply contracts 
with cleaner ones, this has impacts on the power resource mix elsewhere and 
on the transmission grid.  Different types of power generation require 
different amounts of transmission capacity in order to address variability 
in the resource’s output.  Power produced by wind, for example, requires 
significantly more transmission capacity than coal fired power.51  This is 
because coal and natural-gas power plants have historically been 
constructed close to the demand that they serve—and thus require relatively 
little transmission—whereas renewable energy technologies like wind 
and solar, for example, can produce electricity most efficiently only in 
locations that have the most wind and sunshine.52  Put simply, making 
power dispatch decisions outside of California based on Californian 
emission limitations will influence the resource mix and the transmission 
capacity necessary to meet this mix.  Given that not every power plant is 
located an equal distance from California, there is also a possibility that 
some resources will require additional transmission simply to make up for 
the physical line loss associated with transmitted electric power over 
geographic distance. 
Perhaps having heard some of the complaints raised in response to the 
May 4 meeting, FERC Commissioner Moeller wrote to California Governor 
Brown requesting that ARB suspend its enforcement of the anti-resource- 
shuffling regulations.53  This letter echoed the worries of the electricity 
industry over the vague definition of resource shuffling and the affirmation 
requirement.54  In particular, FERC expressed its concern that this 
vagueness combined with the threat of a perjury prosecution might create 
a chilling effect on the Californian electricity market.55  FERC was also 
likely concerned that California’s prohibition on shuffling could effectively 
allow the state to regulate power plants outside of its borders. FERC has 
jurisdiction over “the transmission of electric energy in interstate 
 
 51.  See Matthew L. Wald, Giving the Grid Some Backbone, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 
(Mar. 1 2009), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/giving-the-power-grid-some-
backbone/. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Letter from Moeller, supra note 8. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
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commerce” and “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.”56 
B.  California’s New “Safe Harbors” for Resource Shuffling 
Commissioner Moeller’s letter proved sufficient for ARB to suspend 
enforcement of some of its anti-resource-shuffling regulations.57  Ten 
days after the commissioner sent this letter, ARB Chairman Mary D. 
Nichols wrote back to FERC to inform the agency that ARB had decided 
to suspend the attestation requirement for the first eighteen months of 
active allowance trading.58  On September 20, 2012, ARB formally 
suspended enforcement of the attestation requirement.59  Covered entities 
will no longer need to attest that they have not engaged in resource shuffling 
under the threat of perjury. 
On October 18, 2012, ARB formally resolved to refine the definition of 
resource shuffling.60  In this resolution, ARB proposed thirteen safe 
harbors, transactions in the electricity market that would be per se excluded 
from the definition of resource shuffling.61  These proposed safe harbors 
survived largely untouched in ARB’s draft regulation, which was published 
in July 2013.62 
The Draft Regulation eliminates the attestation requirement altogether.63  
Covered entities will no longer need to attest that they have not engaged 
in resource shuffling under the threat of perjury.  In addition, the Draft 
Regulation amends the definition of resource shuffling to read: “[A]ny 
plan, scheme, or artifice undertaken by a First Deliverer of Electricity to 
substitute electricity deliveries from sources with relatively lower emissions 
for electricity deliveries from sources with relatively higher emissions 
 
 56.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
 57.  Letter from Nichols, supra note 8. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Resolution 12–33, supra note 8. 
 60.  Resolution 12–51, supra note 8. 
 61.  CAL. AIR RES. BD, Attachment A to RESOLUTION 12–51 (2012), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/attachmenta.pdf [hereinafter ARB, Attachment A 
to Resolution 12–51]. 
 62.  Compare id., with CAL. AIR RES. BD, ARTICLE 5: CALIFORNIA CAP ON GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS AND MARKET-BASED COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS § 95852(b)(2)(A), at 96 
(2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/meetings/071813/ct_reg_2013_ 
discussion_draft.pdf  [hereinafter Discussion Draft]. 
 63.  Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2), at 96. 
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resources to reduce its emissions compliance obligation.”64 This definition is 
more of a refinement than a revolution of the earlier definition.  By focusing 
on the substitution of lower emission electricity for higher emission 
electricity, the new definition better captures the mechanisms of resource 
shuffling.  Indeed, the one feature that laundering, cherry picking, and 
facility swapping have in common is that they all involve first-importer 
utilities moving from nominally higher emissions electricity sources to 
nominally lower emissions sources.65  In addition to modifying the definition 
of resource shuffling, the Draft Regulation has provided a specific example 
of the kind of activities that would constitute resource shuffling.66 
The July 2013 Draft Regulation further changes the definition of resource 
shuffling by adopting the thirteen safe harbors that ARB originally proposed 
in October 2012.67  According to ARB staff, these include situations where 
utilities are required to deliver electricity, situations where lower emission 
electricity replaces higher emission electricity due to circumstances beyond a 
utility’s control, situations where power from high emission sources is cut 
back due to low electricity demand, and short term transactions that occur 
for economic reasons—such as congestion—rather than emissions 
regulations.68 
The safe harbor provisions in the new definition of resource shuffling 
provided in the July 2013 Draft Regulation have come under criticism for 
being too permissive and broad in addition to allowing electricity 
importers to engage in considerable resource shuffling.69  Furthermore, 
these safe harbors have been criticized for failing to add clarity to the 
resource shuffling regulations.70  Economists Danny Cullenward and David 
Weiskopf single out Draft Regulation §§ 95852(b)(2)(A)(6) and (8) as 
being especially broad and permissive.71  They appear to have identified a 
problem with California’s new approach:  It allows power deliverers to call a 
broad range of practices something other than shuffling, even where the 
effect of these practices is to increase or avoid reducing carbon emissions. 
 
 64.  Id. § 95802(a)(252), at 47. 
 65.  See generally supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text. 
 66.  Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(B), at 99. 
 67.  Compare Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A), at 86, with ARB, 
Attachment A to Resolution 12–51, supra note 61. 
 68.  CAL. AIR RES. BD, STAFF REPORT: INITIAL STATEMENT OF REASONS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CALIFORNIA CAP ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND MARKET-
BASED COMPLIANCE MECHANISMS 30–31 (2013), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/ 
2013/capandtrade13/capandtrade13isor.pdf [hereinafter ARB, Staff Report]. 
 69.  See Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 19–27. 
 70.  See id. at 31–33. 
 71.  See id. at 21, 23–24. 
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Under safe harbor 6, “electricity deliveries that substitute for deliveries that 
have been discontinued because of termination of a contract or 
divestiture of resources for reasons other than reducing GHG compliance 
obligation” is not resource shuffling.72  Cullenward and Weiskopf point 
out that “so long as [an electricity importer] could make a colorable 
argument that it was motivated by something other than the resource 
shuffling implications of its actions,” it could theoretically shuffle resources 
without running afoul of the anti-resource-shuffling regulation.73  
Interestingly, Cullenward and Weiskopf analyzed the language of the safe 
harbor provisions found in ARB’s October 2012 resolution.74  The 
original sixth safe harbor contained the additional requirement that to 
avoid being counted as resource shuffling, new electricity deliveries must be 
“necessitated” by the termination or divestiture of dirtier resources.75  
While Cullenward and Weiskopf are skeptical of the limiting force of the 
term necessitated,76 it is somewhat telling that even this potentially flimsy 
limit to accessing ARB’s safe harbors has been removed. 
Cullenward and Weiskopf are also especially critical of Draft Regulation § 
95852(b)(2)(A)(8), which creates a safe harbor for “[e]lectricity deliveries 
that are necessitated by expiration of a contract.”77  Cullenward and 
Weiskopf argue that this safe harbor will incentivize participants in the 
California electricity market to enter into short-term contracts.78 Because 
these contracts will expire more frequently, Cullenward and Weiskopf 
argue, there will be more frequent opportunities for electricity importers 
to engage in resource shuffling with impunity.79  It is quite possible that 
Cullenward and Weiskopf overstate their case.  Californian electricity 
importers will no doubt be familiar with the history of the California 
electricity crisis, in which California’s prohibition on entering into long-
term contracts left electricity purchasers vulnerable to the volatility and 
manipulation of the short-term electricity market.80  Wary of a repeat of 
 
 72.  Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(6), at 97. 
 73.  Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 23. 
 74.  See id.; ARB, Attachment A to Resolution 12–51, supra note 61. 
 75.  ARB, Attachment A to Resolution 12–51, supra note 61. 
 76.  Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 23. 
 77.  Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(8); see Cullenward & 
Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 24. 
 78.  Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 24. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 710–11 (3d. ed. 2010). 
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2000 and 2001, electricity importers likely will not abandon long-term 
contracts en masse merely to engage in shuffling. 
Safe harbor 1 also presents problems for the emissions-reduction goal 
of the cap-and-trade program, but these problems are fewer than one might 
think.  Under safe harbor 1, shuffling does not include any “[e]lectricity 
deliveries that are caused by the procurement of electricity eligible to be 
counted towards and purchased for Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS) 
compliance in California.”81  Essentially, this means that first deliverers can 
engage in facility swapping or cherry picking so long as the lower-emission, 
specified power source in question comes from a renewable energy source 
and the generating facility meets certain tracking requirements.82  On 
one hand, this could lead to significant carbon leakage because shuffling is 
no less real merely because a renewable resource is involved. 
On the other hand, after December 31, 2016, 75 percent or more of the 
renewable electricity counted towards Californian utilities’ RPS compliance 
requirements must come from sources whose contribution to the Californian 
electricity market cannot require a substitute power source elsewhere.83  
This means that only 25 percent of electricity procured pursuant to the 
RPS will be able to come from shuffled electricity contracts, which 
significantly limits the potential for the RPS safe harbor to undermine the 
prohibition on shuffling. 
Nevertheless, Cullenward and Weiskopf correctly fault the safe harbors as 
overly broad and permissive.  Many of the safe harbors have been drafted 
purposively, and are thus defined in terms of transactions “made for the 
purpose of” XYZ.84  Covered entities could easily make the claim that 
resource-shuffling transactions were made with any one of the safe 
harbors’ purposes in mind.85  Moreover, depending on the burden of proof 
for establishing safe-harbor protection—which has not been specified in 
 
 81.  Discussion Draft, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(1), at 96. 
 82.  Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 21; see CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, 
RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD ELIGIBILITY 57–91 (7th ed. 2013), available at 
http://www.energy.ca.gov/2013publications/CEC-300-2013-005/CEC-300-2013-005-ED7-SD 
-marked.pdf. 
 83.  CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16(b)(1), (c) (2013); CAL. PUBLIC UTILITIES 
COMM’N, DEC 11-12-052, ORDER INSTITUTING RULEMAKING TO CONTINUE IMPLEMENTATION 
AND ADMINISTRATION OF CALIFORNIA RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARD PROGRAM 
(2011), available at http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/WORD_PDF/FINAL_DECISION/156060. 
PDF. This nonsubstituted electricity must comprise no less than 50 percent of the utilities’ RPS 
requirement in the compliance period ending on December 31, 2013, and no less than 65 
percent of the utilities’ RPS requirement in the period ending on December 31, 2016. See 
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.16(b)(1), (c) (2013). 
 84.  See, e.g., Draft Regulation, supra note 62, § 95852(b)(2)(A)(2), at 96 (exempting 
“electricity deliveries made for the purpose of compliance with state or federal laws and 
regulations” from the definition of resource shuffling) (emphasis added). 
 85.  See. e.g., Cullenward & Weiskopf, supra note 29, at 22. 
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the regulation86—ARB or any other enforcement body may have to prove the 
electricity importer’s subjective intent.  If, for example, ARB were to 
bring an enforcement action against an electricity importer and the 
electricity importer counters that it made the transaction in question for 
the purpose of complying with NERC Reliability Standards,87 then if ARB 
has the burden of proving that a safe harbor does not exist as part of its 
case in chief, the agency would have to prove that the electricity importer 
entered into the transaction for some purpose other than compliance 
with NERC Reliability Standards.  If this were the case, the difficulty of 
bringing an enforcement action would likely undermine the effectiveness 
of the ban. 
Furthermore, these safe harbors, despite their number and breadth, do 
not lend the regulatory regime sufficient clarity to mollify the original 
concerns about market confusion.  The safe harbors are so broad that they 
undermine effective enforcement, and at the same time they are also too 
vague to provide reassurance to the industry.  For example, these safe 
harbors do not satisfactorily answer PG&E’s questions: would the decision 
to switch from a higher-cost, higher-emission electricity source to a lower- 
cost, lower-emission electricity source pursuant to least-cost dispatch 
requirements constitute shuffling?  If so, how should PG&E structure its 
procurement decisions? 
With regard to the first question, safe harbor 2 creates significant 
uncertainty.88  Because the decision to switch to lower-emission electricity 
would be motivated by a desire to comply with least-cost dispatch 
requirements mandated by the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC),89 this transaction would seem to qualify under safe harbor 2.  
However, from a consequentialist perspective, ARB probably did not intend 
such a result, because that would mean that the prohibition on resource 
shuffling would never apply any time that lower-emission electricity, 
by virtue of its smaller allowance-purchase requirement, was cheaper than 
higher-emission electricity.  This would exempt every instance of shuffling 
 
 86.  See id. at 32, 39 (including an explicit burden of proof in the authors’ proposed 
regulation). 
 87.  See Discussion Draft, supra note 62 § 95852(b)(2)(A)(3), at 96–97. 
 88.  See id. § 95852(b)(2)(A)(2) at 96. 
 89.  See Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n, Dec. 02-10-062, Order Instituting Rulemaking to 
Establish Policies and Cost Recovery Mechanisms, at 1–3 (2002), available at http://docs. 
cpuc.ca.gov/word_pdf/FINAL_DECISION/20249.pdf. PG&E Letter, supra note 28, at 1–
3. 
ROSSI-SMITH(ADA) (DO NOT DELETE OR ADD TEXT HERE) 10/4/2016  9:01 AM 
 
62 
from the prohibition—or at least enough instances of shuffling so as to 
nullify the prohibition—although theoretically, first deliverers would not 
be exempt from the prohibition if the lower-emission electricity cost more 
than the higher-emission electricity.  But one would have to wonder when 
and why a first deliverer would switch to a source of electricity that cost more 
than its alternatives, and how an electricity importer could make such a 
decision without running counter to least-cost dispatch practices. 
If, as is likely the case, PG&E’s hypothetical transaction were not 
allowed to qualify for safe harbor 2, then it remains unclear what PG&E 
could or would be required to do.  Most likely, PG&E would not be able 
to reduce its compliance obligation by purchasing the lower-emission 
electricity.  But this solution is not as simple as it seems.  Expanding on 
the hypothetical offered in PG&E’s comments, one could imagine a 
highly efficient (low-emission) natural gas power plant whose bilateral 
contract price of electricity was less than that for an inefficient, dirty-
burning coal-fire power plant—not an impossible hypothetical given recent 
prices of natural gas.  One could even imagine the contract price of the 
natural-gas power plant’s electricity being so low that purchasing electricity 
from the natural-gas power plant would be less expensive even if PG&E 
were not allowed to purchase fewer allowances.  The question would 
then be—how many allowances would PG&E have to purchase?  What 
would count as PG&E’s “original” source of electricity, for which it was 
substituting the lower-emission electricity from the natural-gas power 
plant?  Given the number of sellers that a utility like PG&E purchases from, 
there may be several options to choose from.  Could PG&E purchase 
allowances equivalent to the default emissions rate?90  The regulations do 
not answer these questions satisfactorily. 
IV.  LOOKING UPSTREAM TO WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS FOR A 
SOLUTION TO SHUFFLING 
California’s attestation and safe harbor approaches to regulating shuffling 
are seriously problematic, given the significant role that wholesale power 
markets play in supplying power to meet the demand of customers.  
California might attempt to address the leakage problems associated with 
shuffling on its own—perhaps by even setting a significantly higher implicit 
carbon price in its cap-and-trade system (by effectively lowering its cap)—
but in the end shuffling only highlights the significance of regional and 
national markets in electricity for many states in the U.S. today.  Given 
this significance, the ultimate solutions to carbon leakage problems must 
be national, not subnational.  The EPA, for example, could address carbon 
 
 90.  PG&E Letter, supra note 28, at 3 (offering slight variations on these questions). 
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leakage issues by adopting national emissions standards or, at the extreme, 
adoption of a national or international carbon tax.91  However, to the 
extent federal carbon emissions standards constitute a “floor,” allowing 
states or regional air boards to adopt more rigorous carbon emissions 
standards, leakage will continue to plague subnational efforts to regulate 
carbon emissions.  Another avenue would be for federal energy regulators to 
adopt, or encourage state or regional entities to adopt, upstream 
guidelines to manage carbon leakage in energy dispatch decisions.  This 
article examines how FERC might develop such guidelines and how these 
kinds of federal guidelines may be superior to allowing subnational 
regulators to manage shuffling on their own. 
A.  An Unlikely California Solution 
California’s attestation and shuffling approaches do not adequately 
address the problems associated with shuffling.  There may be minor tweaks 
that can clarify some of the ambiguity and close the loopholes associated 
with safe harbors, but ultimately California regulators are likely to favor 
California-produced electricity over electricity that is imported from out-
of-state.  Such an approach does not bode well for the efficient operation 
of interstate power markets in the West or in other areas of the country 
where subnational carbon emissions requirements present a risk of similar 
carbon leakage from electric power usage. 
Another possible solution, which the economist James Bushnell and his 
coauthors have proposed,92 would be to simply recognize that carbon 
leakage and shuffling is an economic reality and to assume that it will 
occur.  If this assumption is made, the economic solution would seem to 
be to adjust the price of carbon accordingly.  In a cap-and-trade system, 
where the price is implicit, this can only be achieved by reducing the cap 
on carbon, which would result in a rise in allowance prices.  If the estimates 
above are correct in suggesting that the leakage associated with shuffling 
could constitute as much as 47–197 percent of cumulative expected 
 
 91.  Unless carefully designed to include border tax adjustments, even a national 
carbon tax does not solve the carbon leakage problem.  For example, airlines can simply 
refuel in jurisdictions without a tax.  For discussions of these complexities see Gilbert E. 
Mercalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 
(2009). 
 92.  See Bushnell, Downstream Regulation, supra note 20. 
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mitigation by 2020,93 a substantial reduction in California’s cap would be 
required. 
Such a reduction in allowed carbon emissions may be what is necessary in 
order for a state like California or any subnational regulatory body to 
address the leakage associated with shuffling.  Serious concerns already 
abound regarding whether the carbon price is too low, and an increase of 
this nature would have a variety of secondary benefits in moving towards 
lower carbon sources of power supply.  However, such a substantial 
decrease in the cap seems politically controversial and unlikely, especially in 
an environment where California’s approach has already generated 
substantial industry and political backlash. 
B.  EPA and Carbon Leakage from Subnational Regulation 
Another potential solution is to recognize that, at its core, shuffling is a 
byproduct of a jurisdictional mismatch with subnational approaches to 
regulating carbon emissions.  It is well recognized that problems associated 
with carbon emissions transcend any individual jurisdiction’s ability to 
address the issue. The scale of the problem has been recognized to be 
national or even international in scope.94 
Given this, a carbon tax or cap-and-trade program at the national level 
could be devised to address shuffling.  A single price for carbon emissions 
that has a legally preemptive effect on subnational carbon regulation efforts, 
whether they occur in California or elsewhere, would eliminate incentives for 
shuffling at the subnational level.  However, such an approach has not had 
sufficient political support at the national level in the U.S. and its future 
adoption seems unlikely.  It also may be undesirable to completely preempt 
subnational efforts to adopt more restrictive carbon regulations than the 
federal government, given the disproportionate impact that climate change 
may have on some states.95 
Short of adopting a price for carbon, the EPA has taken significant 
action towards regulating the carbon emissions from both new and existing 
power plants.  How these standards are implemented could make a 
 
 93.  See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text. 
 94.  For discussion of the implications of the global impacts of carbon emissions on 
preemption and the choice of federal or state regulation, see Robert L. Glicksman & 
Richard E. Levy, A Collective Action Perspective on Ceiling Regulation by Federal 
Environmental Regulation: The Case of Global Climate Change, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 579 
(2008). 
 95.  As the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA indicates, some places are more likely 
than others to experience adverse effects arising from global climate change.  
Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1442–43 (2007).  States bordering the ocean, for 
example, are at greater risk of flooding than are places that lack coastlines. 
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significant difference in the incentives for shuffling at the subnational 
level.  However, even a national emissions standard adopted by the EPA 
would likely present economic and regulatory challenges for any effort to 
eliminate shuffling, leaving the EPA ill-equipped to solve the problem on 
its own. 
The first challenge is economic.  In their present and anticipated form, 
any national GHG emissions standards for power plants will establish a 
floor, not a ceiling.  States like California, or regional bodies such as RGGI, 
still may adopt more restrictive limitations on the emissions of carbon.  
More restrictive carbon emissions requirements will create the kinds of 
jurisdictional differences in power production costs across states that make 
shuffling attractive in the first place.  Absent preemption of state carbon 
limits, economic incentives for private actors to engage in practices such 
as shuffling will continue. 
The EPA may attempt to police this by approving state approaches to 
implementing the CAA, but the second challenge it will face is regulatory.  
In part because of the Clean Air Act’s reliance on states, and in part due 
to diffuse political opposition to national carbon emissions standards, the 
EPA has signaled that it intends to be flexible in recognizing state 
compliance with any national standards.  This kind of approach will present 
challenges to federal regulators given differences across states in the 
stringency of emissions approaches.  Under section 111(d) of the CAA, 
the EPA seems likely to give states “credit” towards their emissions for 
various renewable, clean energy, and energy efficiency policies.  As one 
author has noted: 
[Since] the stricter state programs do not result in increased stringency of the 
national program, those state programs may not reduce emissions, but rather 
simply export them to other states. Emitters that comply with strict state programs 
will over-comply with the federal standards, and therefore will have allowances 
or credits that can be traded to out-of-state emitters. The buyers of these credits 
can then emit the same amount of GHGs that the state sought to eliminate. 
Because GHGs are global pollutants, the state policy would see no environmental 
benefit.96 
This kind of problem seems inevitable if the EPA embraces flexibility 
in its compliance approach to any carbon emissions limits.  There may be 
solutions, if for example a stricter state opts out of 111(d) flexibility or 
 
 96.  See Nathan Richardson, Playing Without Aces: Offsets and the Limits of Flexibility 
Under Clean Air Act Climate Policy, 42 ENVTL. L. 735, 774 (2012). 
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only allows tradable emissions for any emissions reductions that are 
beyond what both federal and state regulations require.97  But still, 
differences in state regulatory approaches will inevitably contribute to the 
economic incentives for shuffling, and short of a legally preemptive 
national price on carbon, the EPA does not appear to have a clear regulatory 
tool for managing the problem. 
C.  Managing Shuffling Upstream, in Wholesale Power Markets 
Another underexplored avenue for controlling shuffling is to look 
upstream—to the economic incentives created by interstate power markets.  
Under Part II of the Federal Power Act, these markets are exclusively 
controlled by FERC, not by any other regulator.98  Although competitive 
markets favor least-cost dispatch practices, FERC has a statutory obligation 
to ensure that the wholesale rates charged in these markets are not unjust, 
unreasonable and unduly discriminatory,99 and to ensure reliability.100  
National guidelines that prohibit shuffling could be a valid exercise of 
FERC’s regulatory authority. 
To imagine what federal energy market guidelines prohibiting shuffling 
might look like, one need only consider existing federal regulatory 
initiatives that cover interstate power markets.  FERC already regulates 
the rates and reliability conditions imposed by Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs) and Independent Service Operators, including 
California’s Independent Service Operator.101  A substantial new initiative 
by FERC is focusing on transmission planning, and requires transmission 
organizations to consider state public policy requirements.102  These 
requirements conceivably could include state emissions reduction goals 
that go beyond federal emissions requirements, such as California’s cap-
and-trade program for carbon emissions.  As part of its approval of 
transmission operation plans, FERC could specify its own least -cost 
protocols for regional markets with state or regional carbon emissions 
requirement.  These protocols could include harmonized safe harbors that 
 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  FERC has exclusive jurisdiction over the “transmission of electric energy in 
interstate commerce,” the “sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” 
and “all facilities for such transmission or sale of electric energy.”  Federal Power Act 
(FPA) § 201,16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012). 
 99.  Federal Power Act (FPA) §§ 205–06, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824(d)–(e). 
 100.  Id. § 215, 16 U.S.C. § 824(o). 
 101.  See Order No. 888, 75 F.E.R.C. 61,080 (1996); Order No. 889, 75 F.E.R.C. 
61,078 (1996); Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. 61,285 (1999). 
 102.  Order No. 1000, 145 F.E.R.C. 61,252 (2013). 
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would apply in regional power markets regardless of the jurisdictional 
differences in emissions requirements. 
An upstream approach to managing shuffling by federal energy regulators 
would avoid potential preemption conflicts, as occurred between California 
regulators and FERC.  From a political economy perspective, such a 
harmonized approach could serve to safeguard against individual states 
protecting in-state producers and discouraging the purchase of power on 
the interstate power market through their approach to managing shuffling.  At 
the same time, such an approach would set the stage for a national 
approach to carbon regulation that still leaves space for subnational carbon 
emission approaches.  Even with national carbon regulation, such guidelines 
could be important before national standards will only be a floor, so such 
an approach would better position energy markets to accommodate effective 
carbon regulation than the current approach of leaving the management of 
shuffling to state regulators. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The potential for shuffling in wholesale power markets thwarts 
California’s ability to meet its AB 32 GHG emission reduction goals, and 
may even lead to emissions increases.  Yet, as California’s efforts illustrate, 
resource shuffling is extremely difficult to regulate at the state level.  Short of 
California aggressively reducing its emissions limits to reflect the leakage 
problem of shuffling, the state is incapable of solving the problem on its own. 
As states follow California’s lead in crafting their own approaches to 
regulating GHG emissions, national solutions will be necessary to address 
the problem of resource shuffling, given interstate markets in wholesale 
electric power.  Undoubtedly EPA can play a role, but its flexible approach 
to state carbon regulation suggests it is likely to leave the management of 
shuffling largely to states.  Moreover, without some ability to preempt 
states the EPA too is ill-equipped to address shuffling.  This Article has 
argued that the superior solution to resource shuffling lies upstream, in the 
electric power markets managed by FERC.  For subnational carbon 
emissions regulation to meet its goals, it must be recognized that shuffling is 
a problem created by pricing practices in upstream interstate power markets.  
The ultimate solution to this problem lies with the federal regulators who 
manage these markets, not with individual states. 
 
 
 
